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Whereas Fulton was known as `Toots’ because of the noises he made anxiety symptoms edu buy phenergan 25 mg otc, Congreve was `Squibb anxiety symptoms videos order phenergan cheap. By 1813 anxiety symptoms blood pressure buy generic phenergan 25mg online, when stories of the American attack on Canada and the burning of towns and villages reached Britain anxiety exercises purchase generic phenergan pills, there was outrage and calls for revenge anxiety symptoms muscle weakness cheap phenergan online master card. Captain Charles Pasley anxiety statistics purchase phenergan without a prescription, the leading British geostrategist, proposed bombarding the American coastal towns. Robert Southey, the Poet Laureate, applauded the scheme, especially if put into effect with the new giant Congreves. He wrote to Sir Walter Scott that, if British peace proposals were not accepted, `I would run down the [American] coast, and treat the great towns with an exhibition of rockets. The British were obsessed by beating Bonaparte but took no interest in the transatlantic conflict. When Francis Jeffrey, the famous editor of the Edinburgh Review, was in Washington in January 1814 and called on Madison, the President asked him what the British thought about the war. Pressed to reply, he said: `Half the people of England do not know there is a war with America, and those who did had forgotten it. So they put out determined peace—feelers but, at the same time, rushed across the Atlantic forces released by the end of the war in Europe, with the aim of putting pressure on Madison. In view of America’s failure in Canada, Madison should have greeted the news of his French ally’s defeat as a spur to get the best peace settlement he could as fast as possible. But he was dilatory and divided in himself, and his administration reflected this division. Monroe, his Secretary of State, was all for peace and thought pursuit of the war madness. But Madison had appointed General John Armstrong (1758—1843) his Secretary for War, with wide powers to direct the field armies and Armstrong was keen on victory. Madison commanded the Thames order to be revoked, and he disavowed the burning of Newark. Terror was never officially White House policy, and one colonel was court—martialled for a town—burning. Bearing in mind that Britain was now free to retaliate, with an enormous navy of ninety—nine battleships and countless smaller vessels, and with a large army of Peninsular War veterans, Madison’s conduct makes no sense. The British naval commander, Sir Alexander Cochrane, wrote to Monroe that, unless America made reparations for the ‘outrages’ in Upper Canada, his duty was `to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the [American] coast as may be found available. The actual landing by the British on the Chesapeake in August 1814 seems to have taken everyone by surprise. The assault ships under Sir George Cockburn succeeded in landing 5,000 troops under General Robert Ross and withdrawing them, largely unscathed, over a month later. When news of the British landing reached the capital, politicians and generals rushed about not quite knowing what they were doing. Madison himself, Monroe, 181 Armstrong, the Navy Secretary William Jones, and the Attorney—General Richard Rush all made off to a hastily devised defensive camp outside the city, `a scene of disorder and confusion which beggars description. She saved Gilbert Stuart’s fine portrait of Washington, on the dining—room wall of the President’s house, `by breaking the frame, which was screwed to the wall, and having the canvas taken away. Edward Codrington, a British naval officer involved in the operation, reporting events to his wife Jane, wrote: `the enemy flew in all directions [and] scampered away as fast as possible. Dolley had to disguise herself: one tavern, crowded with homeless people, refused her admittance as they blamed her husband for everything. When she took refuge at Rokeby, the country house of Richard Love, his black cook refused to make coffee for her saying: `I done heerd Mr Madison and Mr Armstrong done sold the country to the British. As one American historian put it, `In Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania there were living not far from 1. Yet this great population remained in its towns and cities and suffered 5,000 Englishmen to spend five weeks in its midst without once attempting to drive the invaders from its soil. They fired a volley through the windows of the Capitol, went inside, and set it on fire. Next they went to the President’s house, contemptuously referred to by federalists as `the palace’—it was conspicuously unfinished and had no front porch or lawn—gathered all the furniture in the parlor, and fired it with a live coal from a nearby tavern. They also torched the Treasury Building and the Navy Yard, which burned briskly until a thunderstorm at midnight put it out. Cockburn had a special dislike for the National Intelligencer, which had published scurrilous material about him, and he set fire to its offices, telling the troops: `Be sure that all the presses are destroyed so that the rascals cannot any longer abuse my name. Madison finally found his wife at an inn at Great Falls and prepared to return to his smoldering capital, though as he confessed to Dolly, `I know not where we are in the first instance to hide our heads. The savior soon—one might say instantly—appeared, but in a human shape that Madison, his mentor Jefferson, and the whole of the Virginia ruling establishment found mighty uncongenial, the very opposite of the sort of person who, in their opinion, should rule America. By 1814 Andrew Jackson, the twelve—year—old boy who had been marked for life by a British officer’s sword, had made himself a great and powerful man, of a distinctively new American type. It is worth looking at him in some detail, because to do so tells us so much about life in the early 182 republic. At seventeen, a hungry, almost uneducated orphan, he had turned to a life in the law. In frontier Tennessee, ‘lawyering’ was in practice a blend of land—grabbing, wheeler—dealing, office—seeking, and dueling. Jackson became a pleader in a court, attorney—general for a local district, then judge—advocate in the militia. Ten years later he was already deep in land—speculation, the easiest way for a penniless man to become rich in the United States, but he was almost ruined by an associate’s bankruptcy. His breakthrough came in 1796, when he helped to create the new state of Tennessee, first as congressman, then as senator. He took office as a judge in the state’s Superior Court and founded the first Masonic lodge in Nashville, where he settled in 1801, soon acquiring the magnificent estate of the Hermitage near by. His key move, however, was to get himself elected as major—general of the militia, the power base from which he drove his way to the top. His first duel, fought when he was twenty—one, arose from mutual court—room abuse—a common cause—and ended with Jackson firing into the air. Jackson fought many duels on account of his marriage, in 1790, to Rachel Robards, an older divorced woman, a substitute mother, whom he loved passionately and fiercely defended until her death. Rachel’s divorce proved invalid and the Jacksons, jeered at, were forced to go through a second marriage ceremony. In 1803, when Jackson was a senior judge in Knoxville, the governor of the state, John Sevier, sneered at Rachel and accused Jackson of `taking a trip to Natchez with another man’s wife. Ten days later, however, there was another, bloodier gunfight with various members of Sevier’s family. In 1806 Jackson fought a formal duel with Charles Dickinson, being wounded himself and leaving his opponent to bleed to death. In 1813 Jackson was involved in a series of knock—on duels and fights which led to a violent melee in the streets of Nashville, fought with swordsticks, guns, daggers, and bare fists—Thomas Hart Benton, later a famous senator, was another of those involved—the participants rolling, bleeding and bruised, in the dust. Most of Jackson’s duels, in which he faithfully carried out his mother’s dying injunction, struck a squalid note. Tall and thin (six feet one, weighing 145 pounds), with an erect body crowned by an upstanding thatch of bright red hair, Jackson had a drawn, pain— lined face from which blue eyes blazed furiously, and his frame was chipped and scarred by the marks of a violent frontier existence. Dickinson’s bullet broke two of Jackson’s ribs, buried itself in his chest carrying bits of cloth with it, could never be extracted, and caused a lung abscess which caused him pain for decades. In the Benton duel he was hit in the shoulder, barely saved his arm, and, again, the ball could not be prized out, remaining embedded in the bone and provoking osteomyelitis. In 1825 Jackson, who was accident—prone, stumbled on a staircase, ripped the wound open and caused massive bleeding from which he nearly died and which recurred occasionally all the rest of his life. On top of these hideous scars and bits of metal in his anatomy, Jackson had endemic malaria compounded by dysentery, contracted on campaign. For the first, and for his aching wounds, he took sugar of lead, both externally and internally—a horrifyingly drastic remedy—and for the second, huge doses of calomel which rotted his teeth. He anticipated the hemorrhages by opening a vein; he would `lay bare his arm, bandage it, take his penknife from his pocket, call a servant to hold the bowl and bleed himself freely. His unforgettably fierce 183 but frail figure thus became an embodiment of angry will, working for America’s grand but ruthless purposes. Most people in the West and South wanted war because it would `solve the Indian problem. The Constitution ignored them, saying only that Congress had the power `to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes. North of the Ohio and west of the Hudson was the Northern District; south of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi was the Southern District. Each was under a superintendent who felt some responsibility for his charges, as the British had done. But whereas the crown treated the Indians as `subjects,’ just like the whites (or blacks), the Americans could not regard them as ‘citizens’—they were ‘savages. In the years after the Revolutionary War, the Indians often attacked advancing settlers with success, and efforts by the republic’s young and tiny army were liable to end in abject failure. When Washington took over as president, there were only l00—odd regulars of all ranks, and the Creeks alone had between 3,500 and 6,000 warriors. In October 1790 the Indians repulsed General Josiah Harmar’s army when it invaded western Ohio; they almost destroyed General Arthur St Clair’s force in 1791 near what is now Fort Wayne, Indiana, killing half the 1,400 regulars and militia and sending the rest fleeing in panic. At the Battle of Fallen Timbers, August 20, 1794, Anthony Wayne and his mounted Kentucky Riflemen did something to redress the balance in a vicious engagement which lasted only forty minutes but forced the Shawnees and other tribes to sign the Treaty of Greenville (1795). The Indians had to be subdued by treaties, promises, deception, attrition, disease, and alcohol. Many settled, took European—type names, and, as it were, vanished into the growing mass of ordinary Americans. There were scores of thousands of half—breeds, some of whom identified with the whites, and others who remained tribal. The bulk of the pure— bred Indians seem to have preferred tribalism when they had the choice. In that case, said the settlers, you must move west, to where there is still game and tribalism is still possible. The War of 1812 increased the leverage of the settlers—one reason why they favored it so strongly—because the British played the Indian card and therefore justified the most ferocious anti—Indian measures. The British pursued a systematic policy of organizing and arming minorities against the United States. In the region of the Apalachicola River, then the boundary between West and East Florida, the British major Edward Nicholas, with four officers and 108 Royal Marines, armed and to some extent trained over 4,000 Creeks and Seminoles, distributing 3,000 muskets, 1,000 carbines, 1,000 pistols, 500 rifles, and a million rounds of ammunition. But the leader of their war party, the Shawnee Chief Tecumseh (1768—1813) was in no doubt. With his remarkable oratory, and the predictions of his brother, `The Prophet,’ he had organized a league of Indian tribes and he told their elite (mainly Creeks) in October 1811: `Let the white race perish! Back—aye, back to the great water whose accursed waves brought them to our shores! Burn their dwellings—destroy their stock— slay their wives and children that their very breed may perish! On their way home they murdered American settlers on the Ohio, and this in turn led to civil war among the Indians, for the Chickasaw, fearing reprisals, demanded that the southern Creeks punish the murderers. In the wild frontier territory north of the Spanish colonial capital of Pensacola, the American settlers, plus Indian `friendlies,’ attempted a massacre of the Red Sticks, led by the half—breed Peter McQueen, who had his own prophet in the shape of High—Head Jim. The attempt failed, and the whites retreated into the stockade of another half—breed, Samuel Mims, who was prowhite, 50 miles north of Mobile, on the Gulf. It was an acre of ground surrounded by a log fence, with slits for muskets and two gates. Inside were 150 militiamen, 300 whites, half—breeds and friendlies, and another 300 black slaves. It must be grasped that, at this time, much of the Far South, especially near the coasts, was a lawless area anyway, where groups of men, whites, Indians, half—breeds, escaped slaves, mulattoes, banded together, running their own townships, changing sides frequently. A slave who warned Bailey that the Red Sticks were coming was deemed a liar and flogged, and the stockade gates were actually open when 1,000 Sticks attacked. Bailey was killed trying to shut the gates and all except fifteen whites were slaughtered. At this point Major—General Jackson was told to take the Tennessee militia smith and avenge the disaster. It was just the kind of job he liked and the opportunity for which he had been waiting. On Indians he had exactly the same views as the leader of the anti—British faction in the West, Henry Clay of Kentucky (1777—1852), Speaker of the House and organizer of what were known as the War Hawks. Clay, and John Caldwell Calhoun of South Carolina (1782— 1850), the most articulate spokesman of the Southerners, wanted every unassimilable Indian driven west of the Mississippi. He further argued that the states and the federal government should build roads as quickly as possible, thus attracting settlers who would secure any territory vacated by the Indians immediately. Jackson’s Protestant forebears in Ulster had pursued exactly the same strategy against the `Wild Irish. With him were his bosom pal and partner in land—speculation, General John Coffee, who commanded the cavalry, and various adventurers, including David Crockett (1786—1836), also from Tennessee and a noted sharpshooter, and Samuel Houston (1793—1863), a Virginia—born frontiersman, then only nineteen. On November 3, two months after the massacre, Jackson surrounded the `hostile’ village of Tallushatchee and sent in Coffee with 1,000 men to destroy it. Jackson later reported to his wife Rachel that Coffee ‘executed this order in elegant stile. Jackson, who always had a fellow— feeling for orphans and who was capable of sudden spasms of humanitarianism in the midst of his most ferocious activities, adopted the boy instantly, named him Lyncoya, and had him conveyed to the Hermitage. He wrote to Rachel: `The child must be well taken care of, he may have been given to me for some valuable purpose—in fact when I reflect that he, as to his relations, is so much like myself, I feel an unusual sympathy for him.

During the course anxiety 3 months postpartum buy phenergan 25mg mastercard, we saw the students comfortable in the room anxiety symptoms like heart attack order 25 mg phenergan mastercard, sitting on the floor anxiety symptoms nhs discount phenergan 25mg with visa, participating and taking attendance anxiety lost night buy phenergan 25 mg. In each work anxiety xanax forums purchase phenergan from india, the students showed willingness to anxiety symptoms ringing ears discount phenergan 25 mg free shipping improve to be creative, invent and be original. These features were present throughout the semester and the students learned independent of a final grade recorded from a proof. It is essential that the classroom is an enabling space for an enjoyable and meaningful learning, and for that to happen, it is of great importance that the teacher consider the importance of play. We also conclude that the experience of a methodology and play practice in higher education can both lead to future playful practices in future teachers, but also has influenced students who are already teachers and trainees. This can be seen from the reports of the students to be able develop the theories studied through demonstrating the application of these in practice and also consider, mostly playful methodology as excellent and good, as they had also by objective search it after. It is extremely important that the pedagogy course, that form the future teachers, provide to students during their training and experience the benefits of this playful practice, since it is not used just for the kids. Thus, we break with common sense, which is still present in most classrooms to classify the playful practice as irrelevant to the construction of knowledge. The classroom environment usual was transformed by adults sitting on the floor, wallets in the back, materials such as crayon, clay, ink, cardstock, brushes, crayons, glue and clippings. The room reserved for the Higher Education was full of color and vibrancy, and students perceived that the playful and the play were no longer something restricted to a certain age. This proved that the graduate has the ability to form in its undergraduates to a pedagogical practice agile and challenging, to break with the traditional paradigms and to lead students to learn in a real way and also enjoyable. Having a playful practice is a daily challenge, as it seeks new ways of teaching and learning, so it is important that the teacher has had a base and a prior playful practice in their training course. From this base as important, students reflected on their future practices in the classroom as teachers. We affirm and reflect as Carlos Drummond de Andrade: “Playing with kids is not to waste time, is to earn it; it is sad to see children without school, sadder still see them sitting queued in rooms without air, sterile exercises without value for the formation of human being. In both of them there are some students with disabilities coping with the students named as “regular”. In order to collect data, four playful activities (games) were developed with these groups and photos were also taken in order to illustrate the process. This research was developed during the year of 2012 and is currently in progress, as part of the author’s monograph. The goal of the analysis of the data collected is to evaluate how these playful activities allow the learning process to happen, without infantilizing the aimed group. We all know that the government must guarantee the right of the education to all citizens; however is our duty, especially ours (teachers), to allow a warm education dealing with the differences that make us one. This is our challenge and the challenge of this work: to bring to life what we can only see in the darkness in the internship. Introduction this work arose from the need to investigate whether the playful could be used for the Education of Young People and Adults without treating them as children. We believe that in the Education of Young People and Adults there is space for different educational proposals, among them the recreational activities such a way to include in the literacy process of these students, that are adults but often seen as children by the fact of not knowing how to read and write. With this approach, we continue to seek, through the creation of games, the return of the pleasure of learning of these students that, many times, did not feel the slightest desire to be in the environment of the school. We realized that the facts analyzed by the Research Group Create & Play should be transformed into a specific research within the main theme: the playful in the teaching-learning process. This research was carried out in the course of 2012 until March 2013, as part of the monograph at the end of the course of one of the authors, Priscilla Frazao. From this theoretical basis, we believe that the proposed subject of study has a unique importance as it brings to the scene the question of ludic space as a key place of learning and also, learning difficulties, linking this with the learning of adults. The ludic space, establishing in child and human being the space where culture and symbol inhabit (Winnicott, 1975), is often used as the primary place of learning in kindergarten, being the games and playing their more important instruments. So the question motivating this research is: Can we use the play as a methodological strategy of education without those students feel infantilizedfi For data collecting, initially we observed the classes and then the performance of ludic activities in classrooms, finally we photographed the activities. The observation with group A began in June 2012 and the observation with group B began in March 2013, and they are still in progress. Data analysis was performed to evaluate how the playful activities enabled the students learning without infantilizing them. Objectives the main objective of this research was to demonstrate that the playful could be used in the Education of Youth and Adults without infantilizing students. We also investigated the importance of ludic activities and how it may or may not facilitate learning in Education for Youth and Adults. Methods the survey was conducted in two classes of the Education Program of Adult and Youth (Blocks 1 and 2) in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, with students without disabilities and others who have different disabilities. To collect the data, initially we observed the work of teachers, in order to know how the Education of Youth and Adults has worked in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro. Then we registered the ludic activities in the classes (A and B), making use of photographs and personal notes. Two of them, “Romero Britto Life and Work” and “Alfabetic Labels”, were continuously photographic recorded. For data analysis we choose as reference the proposed content analysis of Bardin (2011). We decided to use all the material collected, both the continuous and the partly photographed, because the field was not modified, i. With this photographic and observational material we tried to answer our main question: Can we use the playful in educating of young people and adults without infantilizing themfi Discussion In the discussion of the results, we will present them divided by activities developed with classes. We conducted this activity because we realized that the students face some difficulties in writing which they spoke, mainly numbers. At the end of the activity, they realized that each symbol has a different nomenclature and also had contact with numbers that do not yet know how to pronounce them or recognize them, especially the large numbers, with three or more digits (400, 500 etc). Students also learned that numbers could be written, and made it clear in their speeches: “I really enjoyed this activity, now I know the numbers, the amount and their names, it is important to me because I work with trade”, Claudio said. Next to the school there are two supermarkets and we observed that, when leaving the class, students always go through them to check prices and buy some things. Thus, seeking a closer relationship between the daily lives of students and what they learned in school, we developed an activity with the purpose of providing the identification of the value of the products and comparing with other products, simulating a trip to the supermarket. The teachers gave to students the supermarkets ads and shopping lists and they were identifying the products from the list in the booklet given to them. The products they did not understand the writing could be asked and then they began to pick up the products from their lists. We observed motivation and attention seeking for the products and commitment to bring the activity to its end. We believe this occurred because the playful proposal created a cheerful and pleasant environment. Upon completion of this activity, the students were able to understand the dynamics of a purchase in the supermarket check the value and calculate the total of their purchases. This is clear in the statements recorded: “Teacher, that was great, now I understand how to make calculations with numbers and I will pay more attention to prices”, Carmen said. Using this ludic activity we found a way to contemplate Arts in a enjoyable and meaningful way to the learner. We chose the artist Romero Britto in order to provide a cultural identification, since in Class A has many students from the Brazilian Northeast region, the same of the artist. It was proposed that each student made his painting from a reading of the work of the artist. Once the activity has been given, the first reaction was the same, the students did not want to participate in the activity, said they did not know how to draw, “I cannot draw, ask another thing teacher, it is very difficult”, Claudio said. Where did we lose the genuine and proper play of primary creativity that embraces the spontaneous gesture of the other and gives it a social recognitionfi During the classes, we perform an activity of “who comes first and who comes after” with the letters of the alphabet, since we realized that the students found great difficulty in understanding the sequence of letters. The main purpose of this activity was to promote the recognition of letters by students in the products used and known by them, bringing the closeness of his life outside of school into the room. By the reaction of the students of Class B, we noted that they learned with joy and pleasure, and realized that they already could read. They repeat what they have learned in their schooling process until his qualification in teaching. In teaching training they review what they experienced and learned in school and college. We defend, instead, the playful as a space of creation and also authorship and autonomy of thought. Reflecting on the Education of Youth and Adults is a challenge to build an emancipatory education that considers the human being as a whole. In this sense, the playful activities present a new way to achieve a more humane, joyful and liberating pedagogy. In this research, we concluded that the teacher needs to understand the power of transformation that the playful education can promote. For this, it is necessary to rethink about our practices, adapting to promote citizenship and also understanding that the classroom constitutes an environment with varied experiences that can be leveraged to encourage students to improve learning. The challenge of working with the playful in Education of Young People and Adults is not only in its inclusion, but how to understand the specifics that this method requires. It is noteworthy that we understand the importance of lectures in order to improve knowledge, however these must be associated with practice, in order to ensure a meaningful and enjoyable learning. Therefore the different groups of organizational newcomers (reemployed, school-leavers and after turnover) have been compared. Since demographic characteristics may also represent life experiences relevant to the work adaptation, previous job experience, age, education, and gender were included as control variables. This study analyse the psychosocial factors of work adaptation outcomes in the distinguished groups of participants (n=56). In opposite to previous assumptions, the results showed reemployed as being high proactive copers and in follow, suffering less during the first period of new employment than others. Introduction the permanent rise of employee’s turnover makes that movement from being organizational outsider towards organizational insider becomes one of the vital topics. According to Bauer and Erdogan (2011; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005), individuals will change their jobs approximately every two years. Careers are likely to involve not only lateral movements across organizations but also increased instability, and periods of unemployment for most workers rather than stability, vertical progression and job security, as it was in the past. One of the consequences for the organization is loss of time and resources because of the need to restart the recruitment and selection cycle, whereas employees suffer from lack of job satisfaction, embeddedness and organizational commitment (Bauer & Erdogan, 2011). Proactive coping theory shows a person as being determined by individual factors and claim responsibility for changing his/her situation. Proactive individual chooses the goals regarded as challenges and consequently try to attain them. Coping becomes in this case a goal management rather than risk management (Greenglass, 2002; Schwarzer & Taubert, 2002). Although they see risk, demands and opportunities in the future, they do not appraise them as threat, harm, or loss (Greenglass, 2002; Schwarzer & Taubert, 2002; Greenglass & Fiksenbaum, 2009). Since unemployment influence a person in a specific manner organizational adaptation could be particularly difficult for newcomers previously unemployed. The need of understanding how people cope and adapt to a new workplace seems to be crucial in this field. Therefore the reemployed individuals have been compared with other organizational newcomers (school-leavers and after turnover). Participants the sample comprised the 56 organizational newcomers who have voluntary agreed to participate in the study. Results the descriptive statistics show the level of proactive coping strategies used by organizational newcomers in the new workplace (see Table 1). The analyzed samples was not equal, however the obtained results illustrated some tendencies evinced by the new workers. The mean scores on the difference between previously unemployed, employed and school-leavers. They also experienced higher emotional costs, stress and have stronger intentions to turn over. The preliminary assumption of lower well-being and poorer coping ability among the reemployed has been not confirmed. The Figure 1 depicts higher tendency to proactive coping, better job satisfaction and work orientation, and higher efficacy beliefs in the focal group. Previously unemployed individuals experienced also lower emotional costs and stress in the new workplace and have lower intentions to change the job. Discussion the descriptive statistics indicated average level of proactive coping among organizational newcomers. This tendency can be seen especially among the group of school-leavers and could cause lower well-being at work and adaptation outcomes: work orientation and job satisfaction. It was hypothesized that adaptation to a new workplace would be particularly difficult for the reemployed. Previously unemployed newcomers have been described as worse proactive copers than other groups analyzed in the study. Considering all negative effects of joblessness on a person, it could be expected that especially those, who have better coping and personal resources, get a new job. Better adaptation outcomes achieving in this group could be explain as a result of higher coping skills. Also the expectations about the job conditions could be verifying and decreasing during the job search process. Do Organizational Socialization Tactics Influence Newcomer Embeddedness and Turnoverfi

This is in line with his argument that evolution is compatible with religious belief anxiety symptoms grief cheap phenergan 25 mg otc, if one means that evolution can also be regarded as a guided or planned process anxiety in relationships buy generic phenergan canada. The compatibility of science and religion that Plantinga seeks is fundamentally denied by Dennett who argues that any ‘outside causal influence’ is a reintroduction of supernaturalism which anxiety symptoms vision buy phenergan uk, he thinks anxiety symptoms yawning buy cheap phenergan 25mg, is contradictory to anxiety symptoms one side of body phenergan 25mg on line science anxiety 24 hour helpline generic 25 mg phenergan mastercard. In this chapter I have presented the main arguments against miracles from a specific scientific outlook. This exposition shows that the arguments as presented by the New Atheists are based on the earlier argumentations of Spinoza and Hume. Despite a number of similarities in their argumentations, there are also fundamental differences among the ‘four horsemen’ of atheism. It can also be observed that the main question asked in the debate is about what ‘evidence’ there is for miracles presuming that they are factual occurrences. And although they allow evidence to be presented, they reject miracles as events which are possible and they deny their assumed supernatural cause as unverifiable. In these debates, religion is presented as if it would oppose or confront science, even as a hindrance to science. In the next chapter I will present a selection of arguments by outlining the position of a number of opponents of such scientific criticism. I will not just explain points of view of opponents who debated the New Atheists such as Richard Swinburne, William Lane Craig and Alister McGrath, but in order to offer a more complete landscape of positions on this topic, I also added other argumentative strategies. I will start by explaining the position of the Roman Catholic Church, as indicated by the two Vatican Councils. In this clarification I will also refer to miracles which are claimed to take place at one of the most famous pilgrimage sites, Lourdes (3. Thereafter the subject of canonisation will be addressed in which confirmation of at least two 1 miracles is required to acquire sainthood in the Church, a procedure which requires scientific 2 research (3. The classic locus of the Roman Catholic argument on miracles can be traced to Thomas Aquinas. According to Aquinas a true miracle occurs when something happens 3 ‘beyond’ the order of nature, by the power of God alone. Thereafter, there would only be additions, elaborations and confirmations of Aquinas’ original argument. Until today this remains the standard reference at the Roman Curia regarding beatification 5 and canonisation. Benedict follows Aquinas’ definition of a miracle with only one notable qualification. For a true miracle, Aquinas required that its observable effect transcends all forces of creation. He argued that some causes are unknown to us because they are performed not by God, but by superior beings, angels or demons and therefore they are not truly ‘miraculous’. It is assumed that a saint can intercede in support of people who pray in the saint’s name. The affirmation is made during a ceremony, in which the Pope proclaims someone to be a saint by using the word ’dicernimus’ (‘we recognise it’). In order to prove this, he uses two arguments, an a posteriori argument based on church practice, and an a priori argument from an analysis of the angelic nature. According to John Hardon’s explanation the a posteriori argument is grounded on the Church’s own investigations with regard to ‘the causes of beatification and canonisation, [in which] miracles are constantly admitted which do not surpass the natural forces of an 6 angel’. He maintains that Benedict came to this decision when he was involved in codifying the rules for recognising miracles in canonisation. During this codification the question was raised whether or not to admit miracles attributed to a ‘good angel’. Benedict reasoned that since good angels are the ministering instruments of God who remains the principal efficient cause, their operations should also be admitted. This confirmed Church practice in which it was assumed that miracles can take place not only through the ministry of angels but also through Man, even after death. Benedict conceded that people, no less than angels, can be physical causes of miraculous effects when, by their prayers and the merits of a holy life, they are able to influence the will of God to carry out a miracle. Adequate criteria that were established for the recognition of a miracle were transcendence of natural causes, at least of those forces which are inherent in the visible world, and a religious purpose directed to the confirmation of truth, divine honour and glory, or personal sanctity. Devils and demons could not be said to work any miracle since they lack this kind of religious purpose. However, it was also acknowledged that God may use these beings as an instrument of his wrath or permit them to exercise their powers to achieve what he intends. This Council declared that miracles should be regarded as ‘divine effects which clearly 7 show forth the omnipotence of God’. On this authority, some theologians held that only God is the efficient cause of miracles. Thus Vacant, in his commentary on the Vatican Council, gives the following interpretation: the Council does not admit a wider concept of miracle, as introduced by certain modern apologists, who extend the term miraculous also to effects which transcend the forces of human and sensible creation – and consequently includes the intervention of angels and demons. This notion, which was elaborated to avoid difficulty in distinguishing certain angelic and demoniac effects as divine interventions, does not solve the problem. In 6 Citations and material from ‘De miraculis’ used in this section, are explained by Hardon, J. However, the majority of the Roman Catholic theologians did not agree with this narrow interpretation, and accepted the wider definition as suggested by Benedict in which the only transcendence necessary and sufficient to constitute a miracle is to have the ‘visible and corporeal forces of nature’ surpassed by an extramundane power operating under 9 obedience to God. It can be illustrated by the declaration of sainthood of Jeanne de Valois in 1951. For canonisation, at least two miracles must have been affirmed, and in the case of Jeanne the first was the healing of Jeanne Mazelhier, who suffered from an infection of the cornea. The Pope concluded that ‘medical witnesses testified that this cure could not have been performed 11 by merely human powers’. The second miracle is said to have taken place when Jeanne Chaynes, who was blind due to illness, unexpectedly had her sight restored while praying to De Valois. In this case medical examination was called upon which affirmed that ‘the cure 12 had transcended human powers’. The First Vatican Council thus defines miracles in the wider sense maintained by Benedict as ‘divine facts’ (facta divina) that prove God’s revelation. In the dogmatic decrees of the Council, any denial of these miracles is faced by grave consequences. If anyone will say that miracles are impossible, and therefore that all the stories about them, also those contained in Holy Scripture, are to be dismissed as fabulous or 8 Vacant criticises in particular the following works in which Benedict’s wider concept of miracle is endorsed: Le Grand, Dissertatio de miraculis, in: Migne, J. This illustrates that the agreement with Benedict’s concept was generally undisputed, and that Vacant’s interpretation was an exception. According to the Council people are moved to faith not by their own personal effort or experience but by God’s revelation, especially by miracles, which prove God’s almighty power. There is no mystery about them: they are facts, divine facts, which is to say that they are observable events, so extraordinary that everyone will be able to conclude by reason that they are directly caused by God who is the only authority able to suspend the order of nature. When a miracle happens, God violates his own natural laws, showing that he is Lord of nature and that, beyond nature, Man has a supernatural final destination. Therefore, miracles can also be regarded as signs since these events can point us to God who reveals himself, calling us to a higher vocation. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) only mentions the subject of miracles once, 14 in the declaration of human freedom. It merely confirms the earlier teaching when referring to Christ: He wrought miracles to illuminate His teaching and to establish its truth, but His intention was to rouse faith in His hearers and to confirm them in faith, not to exert 15 coercion upon them. In order to illustrate the way of reasoning applied by the Roman Catholic Church in 16 the argument on miracles, I will refer to a contribution of Van der Ploeg (1909-2004). He opposes all ‘modernistic’ Roman Catholic dogmatists such as Edward Schillebeeckx and Hans Kung (whose position I will explain later in Chapter 5), who, according to him, deny the classical doctrine of transcendent causation as indicated by Aquinas which had been endorsed by the Councils. Van der Ploeg refers to the First Vatican Council’s explanation that faith is in accordance with reason. God may certainly be known by ‘the natural light of human reason, 17 by means of created things’ and by ‘another and a supernatural way’. God can be known by everyone, because he has revealed himself in natural and in supernatural ways. To prove the reliability of that revelation, Jesus performed many miracles that can be regarded as signs, so that people may believe. My own translation of the Latin text: ‘Si quis dixerit, miracula nulla fieri posse, proindeque omnes de iis narrationes, etiam in sacra Scriptura contentas, inter fabulas vel mythos ablegandas esse; aut miracula certo cognosci nunquam posse, nec iis divinam religionis Christanfi originem rite probari: anathema, sit’. Anathema: originally from the Greek fififififififi (offering), but in the Church used as being banned or cursed. The translation ‘to confirm’ for ‘comprobaret’ could also be replaced by the stronger ‘to prove’. We can believe when we are confronted with miracles, but no one is ever forced to believe. But if what is credible to everyone is denied or turned down, it is regarded as a heavy form of sin which may lead to ‘anathema’ (damnation). To summarise this argument: using reason, everyone can acknowledge that a miracle is not a normal event, but that it has a supernatural cause, which can only be God, or (to extend the argument with Benedict’s addition) an angel, or a human obedient to God. In Gaudium et spes (The joys and the hopes, 1965), the pastoral constitution on the Church in the modern world, the earlier point of view of the relationship between science (or reason) and faith is confirmed by the Second Vatican Council. However, in this document there is a more positive attitude towards the sciences than can be found in the earlier 18 Council. Progress in the practical sciences, technology and the liberal arts is acknowledged and appreciated. Although ‘in consequence of sin certitude is partly obscured and weakened’, the intellectual nature of the human person is perfected by wisdom. Science and religion are, in this document, clearly not opposed to each other but have a hierarchical relationship in which religion is seen as the fulfilment or perfection of Man’s intellectual nature. After outlining the argument on miracles of the Roman Catholic Church, I now turn to the Church’s rebuttal of arguments against miracles as formulated by Spinoza and Hume. In the third chapter of the question of miracles (1914), Joyce argued against those who maintain that proof of a miracle is impossible on three grounds. One argument was that it would always be more reasonable to attribute a miracle to some unknown natural cause than to divine interference. Secondly, the testimonies about miracles are of such an inadequate character that they are not credible. He was a Catholic convert who was ordained in 1903 and became professor of logic and epistemology at St. While writing the question of miracles (1914), he was professor of dogmatic theology at St Beuno’s College, North Wales. Over his career, his work shows a shift in theological position as becomes clear in ‘Two Essays on biblical and on ecclesiastical miracles’. The first essay, ‘The miracles of Scripture’, was written during 1825-26, and the second, ‘The miracles of early ecclesiastical history’, written during 1842-43, when he was about to accept Roman Catholic doctrines, shortly before his conversion. Although Joyce does not mention Spinoza specifically, the first argument can be said 23 to refer to him since he calls it ‘the favourite weapon of the rationalist armoury’. It should be granted that no one is able to assign any limit to the powers of nature. Things once deemed impossible have now (1914) become matters of common experience. By scientific discovery we know exactly what must be regarded as miracles since they clearly ‘exclude the possibility of natural causality of any kind’. Miracles point to a supernatural cause such as the biblical miracles of the feeding of the five thousand or the resurrection of the body. In the case of miraculous healings, one must never exclude the possibility that some unknown natural cause might have produced the effect, but it does not follow that this is so in all cases. Some of the cures that have taken place in Lourdes, Joyce continues, are of such a kind that ‘There can be no question of natural causes here’. As examples, he refers to deep-seated ulcers that disappear immediately and broken bones that are reunited 25 instantaneously. The human intellect is able to attain valid knowledge regarding natural laws, but it can also, in the case of miracles, recognise that ‘the fact lies outside nature’s 26 system’ (my italics). The Spinozistic assertion that nature is the ‘totality of events’ would, according to Joyce, be a case of begging the question, a petitio principii. Above and beyond the physical sciences there is the ‘wider science of metaphysics’, in which human reason is applied to the universe as a whole. This implies that there is no conflict between faith and science but rather a hierarchical order. Above the reign of physics there is metaphysics, the science of the universe, with God as the ‘First Cause’: When physical science assures us regarding some fact that it does not belong to nature’s system, then it is for metaphysics to step in and assure us that it is the effect of some higher causal agency, and in certain cases to affirm unhesitatingly that it can only 27 proceed from the First Cause Himself. Traditional metaphysics, as formulated by Thomas Aquinas, thus remains the cornerstone of Roman Catholic defence of miracles against any rationalistic argument. Science and religion are complementary views in a hierarchical order, the first useful in discovering natural laws and offering Mankind all kinds of technological advantages, the second showing that some events clearly have no natural cause but can only be caused by God. This refers to Hume’s argument: A wise man should proportion his belief to the evidence, and, since we never have sufficient evidence by observation or by means of testimonies (his principal argument), we can deny the occurrence of miracles. Furthermore, even if we would have testimonies about miracles, they would be unreliable on several grounds (the particular arguments). Joyce replies that this argument is based on an a priori assumption that excludes the supernatural, which in modern times has become ‘an 28 indisputable dogma for every cultivated mind’. The argument based on empiricism can never exclude the possibility of a miracle by a supernatural cause. A third argument against miracles was that historical evidence only applies to natural events, and not to the supernatural which belongs to faith. In other words, belief in miracles is a matter of faith, and not a matter of fact. Joyce refers here to the position of church historian Adolf von Harnack who maintained: the historian cannot regard a miracle as a sure given historical event: for in doing so he destroys the mode of consideration on which all historical investigation rests. Every individual miracle remains historically quite doubtful, and a summation of things doubtful never leads to certainty. But should the historian, notwithstanding, be convinced that Jesus Christ did extraordinary things, in the strict sense miraculous things, then, from the unique impression he has obtained of this person, he infers the possession by Him of supernatural power.

Proven phenergan 25 mg. Psychiatry – Anxiety Disorders: By Nikola Grujich M.D..

Moreover anxiety causes order phenergan with paypal, it is typical of the Pauline letters that the exorcism of evil spirits plays an insignificant role compared to anxiety symptoms unreal phenergan 25mg sale the Synoptic Gospels anxiety meme discount 25mg phenergan visa. Bultmann and also Schillebeeckx suggest that in these letters the importance of the miracles lies in the eschatological perspective anxiety symptoms electric shock sensation feelings purchase cheap phenergan online. Paul portrays Satan as Christ’s opponent anxiety young living oils 25mg phenergan with mastercard, although the emphasis is more on how he is used to anxiety symptoms twitching order phenergan 25mg free shipping carry out God’s punishment ‘to deliver such a one to Satan for the 102 destruction of the flesh’. As in the texts of the Synoptic Gospels, Paul states that miracles attributed to God announce a new era that has come in Christ. In this sense, the texts of the Pauline letters confirm that miracle narratives in the New Testament are not regarded as supernatural, magical or paranormal phenomena, but as a ‘signs’ of the imminence of God’s 103 Kingdom. In the interpretation of the biblical texts, he recommended to remain close to those modalities 104 of discourse that are most original within the language of the community of faith. Faith in this community is expressed in very different modes of discourse that should not be neutralised, for example, by harmonising them in some form of pre-understanding or by a reduction to a set of propositions that would only make sense if reference can be made to verifiable facts. These modes are the different voices of the community of faith through which the manifold proclamations associated with God are expressed. In the Old Testament God is expressed as the Creator of the universe, an Actor in miraculous ways, the Source of the Law, 105 the One who speaks through the prophets or who is hidden in wisdom literature. The text in Greek reads: fifififififififififi fififi fifififififififi fifi fifififififi fififi fififififififi fififi fifififififi. However, the I-Thou type of discourse is, for Ricfiur, only one example of God-talk. There are also other modes of discourse about God to be found in the community of faith, a few examples of which I mentioned in this paragraph. Tensions and contrasts in these modes must be upheld due to their theological significance. Ramsey made a similar point by stressing that the different models and qualifiers that are used for ‘God’ must meet the criteria of consistency and coherence that emerge in a language that fits ‘closer and closer to the language which a believer uses about God’. In all of these modes of literature, God is named in a variety of ways, although he remains principally unsayable, indicated by fifififi (Yahweh). In the history of Israel, ‘Yahweh’ is most prominently associated with the act of deliverance of the founding event expressed in the central miracle narrative in the book of Exodus. Ricfiur argued that biblical narratives show to be interrelated and therefore should not be taken out of the context in which they are linked to their founding events: the theology of the Old Testament is first established as a “theology of traditions” around several kernel events: the call of Abraham, the exodus, the anointing of David, and so forth. The theology of traditions names God in accord with a historical drama that recounts itself as a narrative of liberation. God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and is, therefore, the Actant of the great gesture of deliverance. And God’s meaning as Actant is bound up with the founding events in which the community of interpretation recognises itself as enrooted, 107 set up, and established. In his biblical interpretation Ricfiur specifically elaborated on the religious context of the writers of miracle stories that should be considered, which may form a hindrance of understanding for hearers of these stories in a different historical context. Mudge has summarised this problem of understanding by pointing at three ‘moments’ in Ricfiur’s hermeneutical theory: ‘testimony in the making’, the ‘critical moment’ and ‘the post-critical 108 moment which lead to the ‘second naivete’ interpretation of ancient texts. In Ricfiur’s terminology the testimony of the biblical writers operating in a pre-critical context of understanding belongs to the ‘first naivete’. In a next critical stage, contemporary readers can only form an understanding of ancient texts from a contextual distance since they look through their own interpretive lenses. Interpretation always takes place in a specific narrative framework in a community ‘in which it is woven’. Ricfiur expresses this, for example, by saying that ‘Man is this plural and collective unity in which the unity of 109 destination and the differences of destinies are to be understood through each other’. In this volume Von Rad argues that ‘Israel confessed God through the ordering of its sagas, traditions, and stories around a few kernel events from which meaning spread out through the whole structure’. The most ancient kernel would be the Hebraic Credo, such as in Deuteronomy 26:5b-10b. The consequence is that texts from ancient cultures are not easily understood at face value, especially in the case of symbolism and myth. For example, modern Western interpreters of ancient miracle narratives can make a preliminary guess about what they mean, but they have long lost affinity with the world of ancient texts. In our Western world, we have developed a critical attitude towards these texts which has become an indelible part of our interpretation apparatus. Therefore, Ricfiur allows for a diversity of critical approaches to the text, such as form and redaction criticism. He expressed this in the well-known remark that ‘one seeks to 110 explain more in order to understand better’. In and through criticism, one may ‘hear again’ what ancient texts convey to us in, what he calls, a ‘second naivete’. In a post-critical moment, the contemporary interpreter reappropriates biblical concepts through his or her own understanding on which ancient meanings may have a transformative effect: ‘We must understand in order to believe, but we 111 must believe in order to understand’. In his first major work on the philosophy of the will, La symbolique du mal (The symbolism of evil, 1960) Ricfiur realised that the meaningfulness of any kind of discourse can only be measured by its own criteria, a view inspired by Wittgenstein’s later work. He argued that the language used about evil is taken from many ancient symbols and myths and since this kind of language is multi-interpretable or polysemic, it always needs to be reinterpreted. This means that symbols and myths from ancient cultures include a surplus of meaning since they always remain open to new interpretations. Thus, the result of Ricfiur’s historical and literary criticism is to remythologise the symbolic world of ancient texts. It is only by interpretation which is formed, developed and maintained in a tradition that we can ‘hear again’ the words of the text which does not result in the repudiation of the symbolic world of the past but in its re-vivifying and a renewal of its revelatory significance. The starting point of this study was a confrontation between the New Atheists and a number of religious opponents in which the science oriented atheists pressed this point as the most important question. I have indicated that this confrontation leads to a deadlock, not only since it suggests that science would oppose religion, but also because it narrows the debate to a disagreement about facts and evidence which I clarified from the perspective of the post-Enlightenment Western context. In previous sections I also showed that this narrow outlook does not do justice to the ancient religious texts. Instead they suggested a critical hermeneutical approach in order to emphasise what miracle narratives may signify for people who live in a modern Western context. For them miracle stories are not so much about what factually took place in history but they should be understood from considering the hermeneutical horizon of the biblical writers. These theologians used a scientific approach by acknowledging the historical critical method to unravel the different layers of interpretation in the Gospels and penetrate the earliest tradition about Jesus in the Gospels. They argued that the high honorific titles accredited to Jesus only emerged after his death in a re-interpretation which was a common method of historiography in that particular context. Ricfiur argued that biblical narratives are interrelated to crucial founding events which function in a religious community. In this community a linear historical process of God’s actions in the world was assumed, from the creation to its final destiny. In this study I have also indicated that in a number of arguments in favour of miracles a further reconnection is made between science and theology. He points out that science and religion are, and always have been, mutually influential. This study also shows that, for example, science has led to new theological arguments in which miracles are regarded as factual events such as from Heim, Swinburne and Craig. I have also pointed out that scientific research has had an important influence on the traditional Roman Catholic argument since it has influenced the number and types of miracles recognised by the Church. The presentation of the debate as an opposition between science and Western theology can be deconstructed as a misconstrual. Firstly, it contravenes the historical arguments that I 112 have already mentioned. Furthermore, in the present Western context it is generally agreed upon that the natural sciences cannot be the ultimate authority in all areas of life as suggested in an earlier positivistic phase. In his ‘scientific theology’ McGrath argues that the ‘strata of reality’ are now studied by conforming types of science, each with a matching epistemology. This means that the hermeneutical approach in theology has its own epistemology which enables the acknowledgement of the cognitive significance of religious narratives. Ricfiur calls the biblical miracles ‘quasi-empirical’ by regarding these narratives not 113 as a report of facts but as the narration of an event. He argues that this kind of narration is not a list of propositions written in descriptive language that can be used as evidence or considered as ‘revealed truths’. For him, this is an additional dogmatic ecclesiastical interpretation of later centuries, a ‘second-degree discourse’ that prevents us from listening 114 carefully to what biblical texts as a whole convey to us. Witnessing to miracles as a firstdegree discourse in these texts, is ‘no longer to testify that, but to testify to ’, which 115 means that this kind of testimony should be understood as the best proof of a conviction’. In other words, ‘witnessing’ in biblical terms is not about observations of events such as 112 See my criticism on the arguments of the New Atheists, Chapter 4. Miracles herald a new age of the reality of God’s rule and are therefore always associated with a radical renewal or essential transformation, such as in the escape from Egypt to the promised land, an ascension from earth to heaven, a healing from an incurable disease or a resurrection of a body. The creation story can also be seen as an essential transformation since God creates the world out of chaos. The biblical miracles bear witness to these transformative powers and, at the same time, to Man’s unquestionable limitations and finitude. Miracles not only express a cognitive concession of the limitation of the individual, but, in the terminology used, predominantly a transcendent emotional experience by realising Man’s dependence on a greater whole or transcendent power. In the biblical miracle stories, the ‘numinous’ element of the sacred is never primarily something that involves just the 117 intellect or language. For example, early Hebrew texts on miracles indicate an emotive level when God’s acts in Israel’s foundation story are referred to as his ‘marvels’ or ‘wonders’. The New Testament is also full of ‘wonders’ in stories about events that cause the emotional reactions of amazement and awe. This is in line with Rudolf Otto’s reference to the ‘manifestation of the Holy’ which is expressed first and foremost by emphasising an 118 emotional experience of ‘shaking’ (tremendum) and of ‘fascination’ (fascinosum). Ricfiur considers these primordial emotions as modalities of our relation to the world in which ways of belonging are expressed. In his words, these kinds of expressed emotions 119 ‘should throw us into the midst of things’. By reading the biblical miracle stories, the human imagination enables the disclosure of a new world which can be inhabited. Ricfiur maintains that by such a re-enactment a semantic innovation of the narrative takes place in the invention of the plot, which reshapes 120 the reality of the world. In this way, hermeneutics may not only function as a helpful companion in nurturing intellectually satisfactory and emotionally lively religious beliefs. It can also shed new light on the function of creative imaginations that have the power to create a new reality. Ricfiur’s argument on the semantic innovation of narratives in textual form can also be applied to other uses of images in religious communities. For example, in Orthodox Christianity the icon is used as a vehicle not just for personal contemplation in order to be brought into the presence of God, but also to connect oneself to the community of faith, 116 Ricfiur, P. In the Orthodox Church, the icon is ‘part of the whole system of decoration: there you are surrounded by other images, other icons, each of them embodying or 121 conveying different aspects of the divine action in one mode or another’. The ‘work’ of the image is to represent the transcendent reality of God, to confirm the interconnectedness with the community of faith and to strengthen the believers in their conviction. However, it can be asked how hermeneutics as an alternative approach to miracles that focuses on the meaning of miracle narratives, rather than on factuality and evidence, can find a connection with other scientific fields since it emphasises the importance of human interpretation and thus subjectivity. In McGrath’s contribution to the debate it was pointed out that he appreciated the contribution of hermeneutics in its focus on the constructive and subjective nature of interpretation that plays a role in all of the sciences. However, he also warns against a too one-sided approach from this perspective by neglecting the objective side of ‘that what is encountered’. He proposes a balanced view in which the different sciences accommodated in a layered stratification mutually inform and enrich each other. This implies for theologians that they should become more familiar with developments in the natural sciences, psychology and social sciences, and for those who are involved in the natural sciences by seeking connection with the other strata of the sciences, such as religion or theology. However, he recollects that this advice is not new since it has strong historical 122 roots. While Bultmann and Barth, in their dialectical approach in theology, did not seek any connection with developments in science, Ramsey and Ricfiur attempted to build an epistemological bridge by using models and metaphors from human experience that are also used in the natural sciences. They supported Bultmann’s existential hermeneutical approach but with reservations. They pointed out that the language of believers used to refer to God is inevitably formed by people’s own images and ways of thought. Their emphasis on talk about God as the mystery by which Man is confronted principally excludes any preference of a single religious construction or exclusivism. Since human contexts can be very different, religious constructions, in the use of words, images and objects of art are unique ways of pointing to what is unsayable. Ricfiur agreed with Bultmann that ancient narratives have the capacity to cause change, not just in an existential or personal way, but ultimately also in objective-historical, social and political, domains. I suggest extending the capacity of renewal by means of the human imagination also to current neurobiology. The hermeneutical endeavour actually finds support in scientific research on the effects of meditation and practicing a specific conviction, which does not necessarily mean a religious conviction. In a number of arguments I have mentioned that the suggestion was made that some miracles, particularly healing miracles, 121 Williams, R. He argues that the assumption of a confrontational view on science and religion is the result of a remarkable change in the understanding of both the concepts of ‘religion’ and ‘science’ from the seventeenth century onwards and that the Aristotelian concepts scientia and religio underwent important transitions during the Enlightenment. His thesis is that the separation of these concepts developed from the beginning of Enlightenment when rationalism and ‘narrow’ empiricism stood at the cradle of an enormous growth of the body of scientific knowledge.

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